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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
In the case of Cynthia R. Talcott, executrix, v. The United States, the circuit
court of appeals held that the statute of limitations upon collection of taxes
does not apply to recovery of taxes erroneously refunded, and permitted the
government to recover from the taxpayer a refund made by it in error.
In the case of Daniel Winant, et al. executors, v. Bertram Gardner, former
collector, the United States district court, E. D. of New York, held that taxes
voluntarily paid and without protest imposed upon a decedent and his estate
for 1918 and 1919 can not be recovered. This was a case wherein it appeared
that the taxpayer had, through error, paid a greater amount of tax than was
required by the act under which it was imposed.
A taxpayer seeking to have the interest on a refund computed under the
act in force when the allowance was made, protested to the United States
supreme court that the taxing acts were ambiguous, uncertain and uncon
stitutional; that they did not apply to that particular taxpayer, and that the
regulations were arbitrary and unjust. ( United States v. Magnolia Petroleum
Company.)
The circuit court of appeals, third circuit, held that the commissioner’s de
termination as to the amount of depreciation in determining gain on sale of
property is prima facie correct, and book entries as to depreciation, alone, do
not overcome the presumption of correctness. Article 165 of Regulations 69
regarding depreciation reads, in part, as follows:
“While the burden of proof must rest upon the taxpayer to sustain the
deduction taken by him, such deductions must not be disallowed unless
shown by clear and convincing evidence to be unreasonable.”

In view of the ruling, cited above, by the United States district court, article
165 seems to be misleading when it states that depreciation deductions “ must
not be disallowed unless shown by clear and convincing evidence to be un
reasonable.” This ruling would seem to shift the burden of proof to the com
missioner in cases of depreciation taken and duly charged off in the books of
account. However, the court ruled that the commissioner’s determination is
prima facie correct.
In view of the contradictions cited in the foregoing paragraphs and many
others that could be cited, is it any wonder that a taxpayer went before the
United States supreme court and complained to that august body that the
taxing acts are ambiguous and uncertain and that the regulations are arbi
trary and unjust? We think not.
Anyone who assiduously reads the decisions of courts, of the United States
board of tax appeals and of the several other agencies promulgating rules,
sooner or later finds the subject confusing, contradictory in many respects
and the cause of injustice in a considerable number of instances.
Take the case of Cynthia R. Talcott, executrix, as an example. In this case
it appears that Cynthia R. Talcott is the executrix of the last will and testa
ment of her husband; that they had been domiciled in California, and that
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according to the laws of that state the wife is entitled to a half interest in
community property of her deceased husband.
Her husband died in 1919. In 1920 she made a return to the collector of
internal revenue for the estate tax of her deceased husband, including therein
the entire value of community property as subject to the tax and paid the
amount shown therein to the collector. The commissioner in due course in
creased the value of the entire estate and imposed an additional tax of $1,103.50.
At the time the executrix filed her return there was in effect a treasury decision
requiring the inclusion for estate-tax purposes of the entire value of the prop
erty of a deceased husband and surviving wife, where both were domiciled in
California. On January 27, 1925, a contrary ruling was promulgated by the
terms of which only one half the value of the community property of a de
ceased husband and surviving wife domiciled in California was made subject
to the imposition of tax.
On March 3, 1925, relying on the last-mentioned ruling, the executrix filed
a claim for refund of the amount of the tax paid on a value in excess of one half
of the value of the community property. On September 9, 1925, the com
missioner allowed the claim for refund only to the extent of the additional tax
of $1,103.50 he had assessed, but denied the remainder because of the operation
of the statute of limitations on the amount of tax originally paid. The
$1,103.50 refund was then paid to the taxpayer. On July 7, 1926, a new
treasury decision was promulgated as to community property in California by
the terms of which the entire value thereof was subject to taxation. Then the
government filed a claim for the recovery of the $1,103.50 plus interest thereon
on the ground that the refund was made to the taxpayer by the mistake of the
commissioner. The taxpayer moved to strike out the claim of the commis
sioner on the ground that the statute of limitations barred the collection of the
amount so paid in error. The court’s ruling was as follows:

“The statutory limitations upon collection of taxes do not apply to the
recovery of taxes erroneously refunded.”
We imagine that this executrix must feel that there is a great deal of truth in
the statement that the taxing acts are ambiguous and uncertain, and that the
regulations are arbitrary and unjust.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
The interest of a surviving wife in community property of her deceased hus
band and herself, both domiciled in California, is subject to the federal estate
tax imposed by the act of 1918. The statutory limitations upon collection of
taxes do not apply to recovery of taxes erroneously refunded. (U. S. circuit
court of appeals, ninth circuit, Cynthia R. Talcott, executrix, v. United States)
Collection of additional taxes for 1918 assessed in 1925 within the statutory
period as extended by an agreement with the government signed March 1,
1924, is not barred until six years after such assessment. (U. S. district court,
W. D. Louisiana, Florsheim Brothers Dry Goods Co. v. United States.)
The writing under which an inventor employed by a corporation was paid
certain alleged gifts was said to indicate that the payments were compensation
for services, or the complaint when read with the bill of particulars was self
contradictory, and hence the decision of the district court was reversed to allow
the filing of an amended complaint. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, second
circuit, Roy A. Weagant v. Frank K. Bowers.)
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The board of tax appeals was held to have deprived the taxpayer of an op
portunity to prove by competent testimony that the market value of the in
ventory of a retail merchant can be arrived at with reasonable accuracy by add
ing to or deducting from the total cost of the stock a stated percentage of such
cost, and its decision was reversed. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, S. G.
Sample Co., Ltd., v. Commissioner.)
A dividend payable out of surplus accrued prior to March 1, 1913, declared
August 3, 1917, and paid August 25, 1917, is exempt from tax under the pro
viso in section 31 (b), act of 1916, as amended by section 1211, act of 1917,
the date of declaration governing under such proviso, and not the date of pay
ment. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Ralph W. Harbison v. C. G.
Lewellyn, former collector.)
Taxes voluntarily paid and without protest imposed upon a decedent and
his estate for 1918 and 1919 can not be recovered. (U. S. district court, E. D.
New York, Daniel Winant et al., executors, v. Bertram Gardner, former collector.)
Suit for interest on an overassessment for the fiscal year 1918, claimed to be
payable under sec. 1019, act. of 1924, credited on January 28, 1926, against an
additional tax for the fiscal year 1919, may be maintained only against the
United States and not against the former collector in person to whom the tax
was paid. (U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Penn Smokless Coal
Company v. C. G. Lewellyn, former collector.)
A corporation empowered to insure its members against loss of and damages
to jewelry of various kinds, etc., received no income within the meaning of the
1916 and 1917 acts from deposits which insured members were required to
make of an amount estimated to cover losses and expenses of the year, and from
the interest thereon, the balance of which after the payment of losses and in
terest was returned to its members. A corporation organized to insure its
members against loss and damages to jewelry of various kinds, etc., the cost of
such insurance being met from deposits made by the members in advance is
subject to the premium tax imposed by sec. 504, act of 1917. (U. S. circuit
court of appeals, second circuit, Jewelers' Safety Fund Society v. Williams H.
Edwards, former collector.)
Where stockholders of an insurance agency owning 80% of the stock were
regularly and actively engaged in the business of the corporation, the per
centage is large enough to constitute the owners thereof the principal stock
holders, and the corporation fulfilling the other statutory requirements for per
sonal-service classification for 1919 and 1920, is held to be a personal-service
corporation. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit, Henry S. Kaufman,
Ltd., v. Commissioner.)
Attorneys’ fees incurred in defense of a suit for accounting brought by a
former partner constitute a deductible business expense and not a personal
expense. (U. S. supreme court, Samuel J. Kornhauser v. United States.)
Amounts distributed in 1919 in liquidation of a corporation out of earnings
and profits accumulated since February 28, 1923, are payments in exchange
for its stock subject to both normal and surtax under sec. 201 (c), act of 1918.
(U. S. supreme court, Arnold J. Hellmich, collector v. Isadore and Milton Hellman.)
The value of a residuary estate to charitable purposes following a life estate
is taxable as part of the net estate, where the testator gave to his wife the use
of the estate for her natural life with authority to sell and dispose of any real
estate, as she might deem to be for the best interest of the estate, and gave
certain sums for charitable purposes from the balance of the estate at the death
of the life tenant. (U. S. court of claims, Ithaca Trust Company, executor and
trustee, v. United States.)
Interest on refunds should be computed under the provisions of the act
in force when the allowance was made. Sec. 1019, act of 1924, was not in
tended to change the rule as to refunds theretofore allowed. A protest on the
ground that the taxing acts were ambiguous, uncertain and unconstitutional;
that they did not apply to the taxpayer and that the regulations were arbitrary
and unjust, is insufficient to constitute a basis for the allowance of interest from
the date of payment of the taxes under sec. 1324(a), act of 1921. (U. S. su
preme court, United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.)
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A New Jersey bank may deduct taxes for 1917 imposed on its capital stock
within the meaning of the federal act and paid by it where pursuant to the New
Jersey act it elected to become the taxable, without any right over against its
shareholders. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, Frank C. Ferguson, former col
lector, v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.)
Where a manufacturer of candies notified his customers in advance that no
change would be made in the list price but that it would include the war tax,
the federal excise tax to be paid under the act of 1918 is on the net and not the
total amount received. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit, Elmer
Candy Co., Inc., v. John Y. Fauntleroy.)
An injunction to restrain the collection of a tax by distraint may not be
maintained where an appeal has been taken to the United States board of tax
appeals against a jeopardy assessment made under sec. 279(a), act of 1926,
unless a bond has been filed with the collector within ten days after the notice,
as provided in sec. 279(f), the pendency of the appeal to the board not operating
as a stay. (U. S. district court, E. D. Pennsylvania, Abraham Salikoff v.
Blakely D. McCaughn.)
The commissioner’s determination as to the amount of adjustment for de
preciation of the statutory basis in determining gain on sale of property is
prima facie correct, and book entries as to depreciation, alone, do not overcome
the presumption of correctness. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, third circuit,
Edward E. Reick v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
An assessment against a partnership, the successor of a corporation which
dissolved in 1919, for additional 1918 taxes due from the corporation is invalid
under the 1921 act in the absence of language clearly including the partnership
in the class upon which the tax was imposed or permitting assessment thereof
against one related to the taxpayer as the partnership was. (U. S. circuit
court of appeals, fifth circuit, Dreyfuss Dry Goods Co. v. D. Arthur Lines,
former collector.)
The statute authorizing distraint for taxes contemplates distraint and sale
of goods and the chattels of the delinquent taxpayer, not the property of some
one other than the taxpayer. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit,
Dreyfuss Dry Goods Co. v. D. Arthur Lines, former collector.)
A taxpayer is not prevented in a suit for recovery of taxes from pleading the
bar of the statute of limitations by the failure specifically to mention it in his
claim for refund, where such claim plainly disclosed that a suit or proceeding
for collection of the tax was barred. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth cir
cuit, Dreyfuss Dry Goods Co. v. D. Arthur Lines, former collector.)
A husband, resident in Louisiana, who had incorrectly returned his income
for 1917 and 1918, and had paid additional assessments for such years, and also
amounts in compromise of his civil and criminal liability for filing incorrect
returns, was denied a refund of taxes which he claimed on the ground that he
was entitled to the benefit of the community-property ruling under treasury
decision 3138 allowing returns on a separate basis. (U. S. court of claims,
Samuel Zemurray v. United States.)
Excise tax on sales of jewelry by a dealer under acts of 1918 and 1921 held
applicable to transfer of jewelry as premiums in redemption of coupons issued
with each purchase of plaintiff’s soap products. The selling price upon which
the tax should be computed is the fair market value of the articles transferred.
(U. S. court of claims, Colgate & Co. v. United States.)
Invested capital should include the cost of construction of a coal mine be
yond a profitable depth. The value of houses erected as living quarters for
mining employees to be included in invested capital should not be limited to the
cost as shown by taxpayer’s books, which did not disclose the cost or value of
all the materials used, but the value of such houses as a whole should be con
sidered. (Circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit, Blockton Cahaba Coal Co., et
al. v. United States.)
Petitions alleging an overpayment of taxes for 1919, the amount thereof;
that a claim for refund had been filed, and that six months had elapsed and the
commissioner had neither allowed nor rejected such claim, held to have stated
the ultimate facts sufficiently as against a motion to dismiss for want of juris-
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diction. (U. S. district court, Kansas, first division, Elmhurst Investment Co.
v. United States.)
A return for the calendar year 1917 was held to reflect income correctly
where the taxpayer took a physical inventory on May 31st and ruled off the
books as of May 31st, but used a December 31st, 1916, opening inventory and
a December 31st, 1927, closing inventory taken at cost which was lower than
market, based on inventories and accurate accounting data and including a
physical count of small stores, which inventories were taken in accordance
with its uniform practice since 1907 of submitting monthly to its board of di
rectors a comparative balance-sheet which necessitated a monthly inventory.
(U. S. district court of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, Inc.,
v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
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